The magnitude of the short term market reaction to news announcements is adversely affected by the total number of announcements that day. We argue that the total number of announcements creates a level of distraction that results in a significant underreaction on high distraction days. The relative order in which announcements are released during the day also plays a role in the market reaction. The delay in the market reaction is not caused by either additional information releases by the company or by analyst recommendation revisions. Our results emphasize the importance of actions taken in the Australian market to reduce the impact of investor distraction that could be emulated in other markets, such as labeling certain announcements as market sensitive and using trading halts to attract investor attention.
Introduction
A potentially important factor determining the market reaction to information arrival is the level of investor distraction when the particular piece of information is released to the market. On any single day, the volume of information about firms may exceed what a typical trader or investor can gather and process. In this respect, the overall volume of information in the market at a certain point in time is likely to affect the level of attention traders and investors can pay to specific information releases by individual firms. Disclosure regulation attempts to level the playing field by promoting transparency. However, higher transparency standards mean more information reaches the market, potentially leading to increases in the level of investor distraction.
The psychology literature first identified the effect of time constraints and distraction on the ability to make decisions. Wright (1974) showed through experimental evidence that when facing time constraints or distraction, people tended to overweight negative information compared to decision makers not subject to the time constraints or distraction. In another stream of research, Agnew and Szykman (2005) identify information overload as a related constraint that affects financial decision making. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) build on this literature and propose the investor distraction hypothesis that predicts that with more extraneous news events, investors will be distracted and will underreact to news from the firm. They confirm their hypothesis by examining quarterly earnings announcements between 1995 and 2004. The bulk of this time period is before Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect in the U.S., creating a stricter regulatory environment that now more closely mirrors the Australian regulatory environment.
We examine market sensitive announcements (MSAs) released by companies trading on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) between 2005 and 2009 and find that the magnitude of the short term market response to MSAs is negatively related to the number of MSAs released on the announcement day. The magnitude of the market reaction to nonperiodic MSAs is not affected by the level of distraction present on the announcement day.
However, a second proxy for the level of distraction is the relative order in which announcements are released during the day. This distraction proxy is found to be more relevant than the number of MSAs in reducing the short term magnitude of the market reaction. Further support for the investor distraction hypothesis is found when the delayed market response to MSAs is examined. The difference between the magnitude of the delayed market reaction and the magnitude of the short term market reaction increases with the level of distraction on the announcement day. Our findings also suggest analyst revisions are not responsible for the increase in delayed market reaction. Instead, analyst revisions are just another way in which higher attention to certain announcements is revealed in the days that follow the release.
The interplay between investor distraction and transparency is of particular interest under the Australian disclosure environment. Continuous disclosure requirements in Australia aim to increase the timeliness and level of transparency, intending to identify those announcements that are expected to be relevant in the investment decision process. First, the immediacy requirement in Australia requires information to be promptly disclosed to the market. In Chapter 3 of the ASX listing rules, Rule 3.1 states that: "Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity's securities, the entity must immediately tell the ASX that information" The implementation of continuous disclosure requirements in Australia resulted in an increase in the number of disclosures by firms and researchers found support for the idea that announcements classified as MSAs are informative. For example, Brown et al. (2004 and show that after MSAs are released, order flow increases as does the rate of price change. Even though the continuous disclosure environment improves the information environment in which traders and investors make decisions, the increase in the number of announcements may make it difficult for market participants to focus on all announcements.
This regulatory environment with strict information dissemination is an excellent market in which to test the investor distraction hypothesis.
Our research contributes to the finance literature by providing additional empirical evidence on how the information environment affects investor and trader behavior. The centralized news platform in Australia allows precision in determining when information is disseminated and the classification system identifies the type of announcement as well as the expected level of importance with regard to market pricing. In addition, by using all announcements, our analysis reflects the complete information environment when determining the effects of distraction on the immediate and delayed market response.
2 These trading interruptions can take one of two forms. One is an ordinary procedure followed by which the ASX places a company's securities into a Pre-Opening Phase when it receives an announcement and considers it to be market sensitive. This trade interruption is 10 minutes long for most announcements and it is 60 minutes long for takeover announcements. The other kind of trade interruption is a proper trading halt requested by a company when it expects the occurrence of an event but is not in a position to accurately inform the market. These trading halts last until the announcement is made or the commencement of trading on the second day after the trading halt was imposed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies the four streams of literature that motivate this research. Section 3 presents the methodology and develops the hypotheses.
Section 4 describes the data. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Background
In connection with Kahneman's (1973) idea that humans have limited cognitive resources that hinder their ability to perform multiple tasks simultaneously, several hypotheses make predictions about the way different aspects of the information environment affect the behavior of investors. The four relevant streams in the literature are the investor recognition hypothesis, the investor limited attention hypothesis, the investor inattention hypothesis and the investor distraction hypothesis. All of these related works have predictions about the way in which these cognitive limitations affect how investors decide whether to buy or sell some stocks and not others; the way information is presented to investors; the timing of information disclosures depending on whether they contain good or bad news; and how simultaneous information about different stocks can be processed. Each of the four areas of prediction are explained next.
First, Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis rests on the idea that information gathering costs limit the number of different securities an investor can hold. Merton suggests that high information gathering costs drive investors to hold a set of assets with which they are familiar. In this view, investors only pay attention to the firms they follow and ignore information about other firms even if they can profit from that information. This argument by
Merton is consistent with Arbel's et al. (1983) findings of a neglected firm effect. Arbel et al. report firms that have low institutional holdings and are barely followed by analysts show superior returns compared to firms widely held by institutional investors or followed by a large number of analysts. In contrast, Beard and Sias (1997) find for a later period that the neglected firm effect disappears after controlling for the correlation between neglect and market capitalization. The relative importance of information gathering costs may be lower now since improved information dissemination and more transparent disclosure policies require less effort to follow a larger number of securities.
Second, from the perspective of limited attention, Barber and Odean (2008) argue that individual investors' buying decisions are influenced by the level of public exposure of firms.
When facing many investing alternatives, investors reduce their choice set to stocks associated with attention-grabbing events. Using brokerage firm data and comparing the buysell imbalances to those of a group of institutional investors, they find that individual investors are net buyers of stocks with high public exposure. They use three proxies for attention-grabbing events: unusual trading volume, high abnormal returns and news reported on the Dow Jones News Service. The experiment does not measure the impact of mandatory and voluntary disclosures by the firms, limiting the analysis of individual investor attention to public sources of information and market data. In contrast to Merton's (1987) information gathering costs argument, Barber and Odean's prediction, based on the limited attention of individual investors, seems to be reinforced as investors' access to information increases.
The impact of investor limited attention on the way information is presented is relevant for firms making voluntary disclosures as well as for regulatory attempts at increasing disclosure. Modeling information disclosure, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that under limited investor attention, disclosures with equal information value can have different effects on investors depending on the structure of presentation, or the place in the report where information is located. Another consequence of limited investor attention on the design of disclosure requirements is discussed by Hirshleifer et al. (2004) ; they suggest disclosure by one firm can distract investors' attention away from other disclosure by the same firm or from the information implicit in non-disclosure by other firms. They conclude that regulatory attempts to increase disclosure under limited attention could diminish investor discernment and it cannot be assured that more disclosure is desirable.
Third, investor inattention during certain time periods suggests that managers may time information disclosures to minimize the short term adverse effect of bad news and to maximize the short term impact of good news. Patell and Wolfson (1982) other specific firm characteristics, they find this likelihood is greater for small firms because they get less media attention.
Strategic timing by managers is also supported by Gennotte and Trueman (1996) . They argue that announcements issued after trading hours have a lower impact on prices than announcements issued during trading hours and they analyze two strategic aspects of mandatory announcements. One aspect is the timing of the announcement. They expect managers will make positive earnings announcements during trading hours and negative earnings announcements after the end of the trading day, including after Friday's session.
Second, they also expect a strategic behavior when disclosing several pieces of information,
indicating that managers will tend to split good news into separate announcements, and to communicate bad news in aggregate. They suggest market makers' ability to infer informed trading and incorporate relevant information into prices following an announcement made after trading hours is diminished by incoming orders by noise traders and from trades motivated by other disclosures. Even though they do not explicitly mention it, the last part of the argument is related to the idea of limited attention.
In contrast to Gennotte and Trueman (1996) , Abad et al. (2009) find that firms included in the Spanish IBEX 35 index issue about two thirds of negative earnings surprises during trading hours while they disclose two thirds of positive earnings after hours. They find that during the day it takes an hour and a half after an announcement until liquidity improves, while for overnight announcements liquidity improves immediately after the market opens the following day. Evidence of the impact of limited attention on the strategic timing of mandatory and voluntary disclosures is not conclusive, and there are several market characteristics that may influence the high and low attention times in each market.
Fourth, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) In summary, the literature focuses on how investors' limited attention affects the way in which investors decide whether to buy or sell some stocks and not others; the way information is presented to investors; the timing of information disclosures depending on whether they contain good or bad news; and how concurrent information about different stocks can damage investors' promptness to react to incoming information. In this last effect, the common practice is to consider concurrent earnings announcements, voluntary earnings forecasts, macroeconomic announcements and different measures of media coverage. There are no studies using all sources of mandatory disclosure as a proxy for concurrent information.
Hypotheses Development and Methodology
The underlying assumption of the investor distraction hypothesis is that, given investors' limited cognitive processing capacity, the market reaction to information releases will be affected by the level of competing information faced by investors. Following Hirshleifer et al. (2009) , there are two observable consequences of the investor distraction hypothesis. The first prediction of the investor distraction hypothesis is that the short term reaction to MSAs should be negatively related to the level of distracting information in the market on the release date. Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested is:
The magnitude of the short term market reaction to MSAs is negatively related to the amount of news released on the announcement day.
The second prediction of the investor distraction hypothesis is that following the immediate under-reaction to information released on days with a higher number of concurrent announcements, a correction is expected to occur in the post-announcement period.
Therefore, an additional test of the impact of distraction on investor behavior is related to the delayed response to MSAs. The benchmark values for both groups of dependent variables, the short term response and the delayed response, are calculated from the 10 trading days before the announcement day. The short term response is measured for one trading day starting after the MSA is released. This shorter window is a substantial improvement over Hirshleifer et al.'s (2009) two-day window. Using intraday data, the response to MSAs is crucial because the speed of adjustment to prices after some MSAs is expected to be very quick and would make it difficult to distinguish them from other announcements when using a less timely response over a two-day window. The delayed market reaction is also measured for a shorter period than in Hirshleifer et al. since they measure delayed response initially using a 60 day window, and they also vary the size to 30 and 90 days. Because our study includes all MSAs, a long post-announcement window would significantly reduce the number of events. For that reason the post-announcement window is chosen to be 10 trading days. For each window, only those company-announcements that do not overlap with previous announcements are included in the analysis. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) estimate the market reaction by measuring the cumulative abnormal return and the abnormal volume. Since their study is limited to earnings announcements, they are able to control for the magnitude of new information disclosed using a measure of earnings surprise. We include all types of MSAs in our study, and since there since we do not have an estimate of the market expectation we cannot control for the expected return reaction to each announcement.
We focus on the magnitude of the market response, measuring the abnormal number of trades and the abnormal volume for both the one and ten-day periods: The fundamental independent variable to examine the investor distraction hypothesis is the total number of concurrent MSAs released on the announcement day. For any given day, the total number of MSAs is the count of MSAs released between the market close on the previous day and the last trading minute on the announcement day. Distraction does not affect all announcements released during the day in the same way. Announcements released later in the day are expected to suffer more from MSAs previously released during day. For this reason we include a variable measuring the relative order in which each MSA is released during the day.
Several other control variables are included to determine whether firm specific characteristics (size, industry), announcements specific characteristics (type of announcement, good/bad news) and time-specific characteristics (time of the day, day of the week, month of the year) have an impact on the magnitude of the market reaction to MSAs. Despite the indication of announcements as market sensitive, the impact on the market of an announcement made by a large firm is expected to be higher than the impact of another market sensitive announcement issued by a small firm. The type of announcements is also expected to cause differential effects. Both a takeover announcement and an on-market buyback can be market sensitive. But if both are disclosed on the same day, the relative impact of the buy-back announcement is expected to be much lower. Finally, considering the timing of MSAs as well as the sign of the return reaction will provide evidence on whether managers strategically disclose good and bad news. Even though Australia's continuous disclosure requirements leave little space to let managers decide when to disclose market relevant information, there is some room for management's discretionary disclosure throughout the day. Firms can also request a trading halt when they have an impending announcement but they cannot accurately inform the market. This type of trading halt may increase investor attention at the time the announcement is finally released. For this reason we control for those
MSAs that are preceded by a trading halt request made by the company.
Sample Description
The final sample is composed of 24,519 MSAs that are not preceded or followed by another MSA released by the same company for at least ten trading days 3 . Announcements, [Insert Table 1 about here] 3 The only exception is MSAs released within two trading days after a trading halt or a suspension from quotation. These MSAs are kept and identified as announcements preceded by a halt or suspension.
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) explain the low proportion of earnings announcements on
Fridays, arguing firms would not choose a high inattention day (Friday) to release a scheduled announcement. Remarkably, Panel A in Table 1 reports that the one-day return, in response to both good and bad news periodic MSAs released on Fridays, is significantly higher than the one-day return in response to periodic MSAs released from Monday to Thursday. Even though our focus is not on the return 4 , it is noteworthy that these findings reject the idea of
Fridays as a high inattention day.
Regarding disclosure across the time of day, the proportion of bad news released during market hours (55%) is slightly lower than the proportion of good news released during market hours (58%). As shown in Table 1 Panel B, this difference is consistent across periodic MSAs, non-periodic MSAs and multiple MSAs. There may be an incentive to release good news MSAs during trading hours. Mean and median one-day returns are significantly higher in response to good news MSAs released during market hours than in response to MSAs released before or after hours. The higher return response to MSAs released during market hours compared to the return response to MSAs released before trading hours is significant for multiple and periodic MSAs. The higher return response to MSAs released during market hours compared to after market hours is significant for multiple MSAs and non-periodic MSAs. For bad news MSAs, mean and median one-day returns in response to MSAs released during market hours are significantly higher (more negative) than returns following MSAs released before market hours. These findings suggest there may be some selective disclosure of bad news after trading hours (19% of bad news and only 14% of good news are released after hours). However, median returns following MSAs released during market hours are significantly lower (less negative) than returns in response to after-hours MSAs. Therefore, trying to disguise bad news by releasing it after market hours does not seem to be an effective practice.
The distribution of MSAs across investor distraction quintiles measured by the number of MSAs released on the announcement day is different for good and bad news. As reported in Table 1 , Panel C, the proportion of bad news MSAs released on high distraction days (Quintile 5) is considerably larger (25%) than the proportion of bad news MSAs (18%) released on low distraction days (Quintile 1). For good news MSAs high distraction days (Quintile 5) is the least populated quintile with 17% of all observations. For both good and bad news MSAs, the market reaction on high distraction days is significantly lower than the market reaction on low distraction days (mean one-day return is 41 basis points lower for bad news and 102 basis points for good news). However, median one-day returns are not significantly different between announcements released on the top and bottom distraction level quintiles. Since periodic MSAs tend to be clustered in time, their distribution is much more concentrated on high distraction days. In this context, the proportion of periodic MSAs released during high distraction days is indeed higher for bad news (48.5%) than for good news (44.2%). The mean one-day return in response to bad news MSAs is 99 basis points smaller on high distraction days (-6.16%) than on low distraction days (-7.15%). There is, however, no significant difference in median returns. For multiple MSAs the proportion of MSAs increases monotonically across distraction quintiles. The proportion of bad news multiple MSAs (35.2%) is considerably higher than the proportion of goods news multiple MSAs (26.1%) released on high distraction days. The mean one-day return response to both good and bad news multiple MSAs on high distraction days are significantly lower than on low distraction day, but no difference in median returns is found.
The distribution of non-periodic MSAs across distraction quintiles is the opposite of that for periodic and multiple MSAs. The proportion of bad news non-periodic MSAs drops from 24.3% on low distraction days to 6.3% on high distraction days. Similarly, the proportion of good news non-periodic MSAs drops from 26.9% on low distraction days to 5.8% on high distraction days. The presence of different levels of investor distraction seems to have an impact on the return response to non-periodic MSAs. Both mean and median one-day return responses to good and bad news non-periodic MSAs on high distraction days are significantly lower than one-day responses on low distraction days.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Results
To analyze the magnitude of the market response to MSAs, the sample is first divided by the sign of the one-day return into good news and bad news MSAs. Second, the sample is partitioned into level of distraction quintiles. Finally, within each news sign and distraction quintile, the sample is divided into one-day return quintiles.
Magnitude of the market response
The amount of trading after the release of MSAs is compared to the average daily trading during the benchmark period in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 , Panel A compares the oneday abnormal trading compared to the benchmark period and the results indicate that as the level of distraction increases, there is a decline in the abnormal number of trades. Comparing distraction quintiles 1 and 5 shows that the abnormal number of trades on high distraction days is significantly lower than the abnormal number of trades on low distraction days. These findings are consistent across return quintiles and support the investor distraction hypothesis.
The impact of distraction is more significant for good news MSAs. For these announcements, the median abnormal number of trades on high distraction days across return quintiles is between 32% and 53% lower than on low distraction days. For bad news MSAs the median abnormal number of trades on high distraction days drops by 15% to 42% compared to low distraction days. On low distraction days the level of distraction affects the magnitude of the short term response to MSAs 5 and the impact is more acute for bad news MSAs. Median one-day abnormal number of trades in response to bad news MSAs is above 1 only for MSAs in the top two return quintiles. Even though median one-day returns for the lowest three quintiles are economically significant (-1.47%, -2.55%, and -4.01%), the median number of trades during the first day after the bad news MSAs in these quintiles is between 86% and 49% of the number of trades executed in the ten days before the announcement. The pattern across distraction quintiles indicates that as the level of distraction increases, the number of abnormal trades declines even within each return quintile. A similar pattern is present for good news MSAs in return quintiles 1 and 2. With median one-day returns of 1.58% and 2.98%, respectively, the median number of trades during the first day is between 93% and 59% of the number of trades executed in the ten days before the announcement. Panel B of Table 2 [Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
Investor Distraction and the Short Term Response to MSAs
This section analyzes the extent to which the total number of MSAs released on the announcement day affect the market response to MSAs when other firm, announcement and information environment characteristics are considered. In Tables 4 and 5 [Insert Table 4 about here]
The impact of the number of MSAs released on the announcement day has the expected sign in the magnitude of market response regressions. Panel A of Table 4 [Insert Table 5 Table 4 indicates that the amount of market sensitive information present at the moment a MSA is released affects investors' awareness even after considering the total amount of information disclosed on the announcement date. The importance of the relative order on the magnitude of market reaction is also present across MSA types (Table 4 , Panels B and C) and return quintiles (Table 5) .
Investor Distraction and the Delayed Response to MSAs
This section analyzes the second observable consequence of the investor distraction hypothesis: the extent to which the total number of MSAs released on the announcement day affects the relation between the delayed market response to MSAs and the short term market response to MSAs. Panel A of Table 6 [Insert Table 6 about here] The positive relation between the level of distraction and the incremental delayed market reaction to MSAs could be partially explained by incremental information produced after the announcement release. Since the sample only includes MSAs with no other announcements overlapping in the post-event window, the additional information could be that produced by analysts. Panel B of Table 6 reports the coefficients of the regression of the incremental delayed market reaction to MSAs on the same variables included in Panel A of Table 6 and allowing for an additional dummy variable taking the value 1 when an analyst recommendation revision is released on the announcements date or in the following three days. A positive coefficient for the revision variable would suggest analyst recommendation revisions contribute to the increased investor attention during the days that follow the release of MSAs. However, the coefficients of the revision dummy variable are negative and statistically significant in both the incremental delayed one-day number of trades and the incremental delayed one-day trading volume regressions. These findings suggest analyst revisions are just another way in which higher attention to certain announcements is revealed rather than being the cause of abnormal trading in the days that follow the release of MSAs.
Investor Distraction and Firm Selective Disclosure
The impact of disclosing MSAs outside market hours is measured by including a dummy variable taking the value 1 for MSAs released either before or after market hours. In Table 7 indicates that MSAs released before market hours are associated with a higher magnitude of market reaction. This finding is consistent with the slightly higher proportion of good news MSAs released before market hours (Panel B of Table 1 shows that 28% of good news and 26% of bad news are released before market hours). In Table 7 , Panels B and C, the influence of before hours MSAs is not present across all MSA types.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
The higher proportion of bad news released after trading hours suggests there may be selective disclosure of bad news after trading hours (19% of bad news and only 14% of good news are released after hours). These findings are corroborated in There is, however, very little impact on the market reaction to periodic MSAs.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Market Mechanisms to reduce Investor Distraction
Each time a firm releases a MSA, the ASX places a company's securities into the PreOpening Phase for at least 10 minutes to give investors the opportunity to digest the new information before trading resumes. The other kind of trade interruption is a trading halt requested by a company when it expects the occurrence of an event but is not in a position to accurately inform the market. These trading halts last until the announcement is made or the commencement of trading on the second day after the trading halt was initially imposed. This second trading halt type could also be a means by which companies could increase investor awareness of an incoming announcement. To test how effective this mechanism is we include a dummy variable in all models to identify those MSAs that were preceded by a trading halt request by the company.
Indeed, Panel A of Table 4 reports positive and significant coefficients for the trading halt variable. That is, for the one-day abnormal number of trades these results suggest firms increase investor attention by requesting trading halts in anticipation of MSAs. Panels B and C of Table 5 provide evidence that trading halts requested before non-periodic and multiple
MSAs are more effective than trading halts in anticipation of periodic MSAs. There are two plausible explanations for this finding that are not mutually exclusive. One is that the increase in investor awareness produced by trading halts is only marginal among periodic MSAs which are already expected. Another possible explanation is related to the fact that periodic MSAs tend to be clustered in time and therefore subject to higher levels of investor distraction that cannot be offset by a trading halt request. The impact of trading halts in reducing the impact of investor distraction is also observed in the delayed market reaction to MSAs.
Coefficients for the halt indicator variable in Table 6 , where the dependent variables are the delayed abnormal number of trades differential and the delayed abnormal trading volume differential, are negative and statistically significant.
Conclusion
This research contributes to our understanding of investor behavior by studying the impact of the level of investor distraction on the magnitude of the reaction to relevant information in a market with a disclosure regulation that reduces the number of potentially confounding events and provides investors with mechanisms to distinguish those announcements that are expected to be more relevant. Another contribution of this work to the investor distraction literature is the inclusion of all announcement types and not only earnings releases. This feature represents a considerable improvement to the understanding of how competing information affects the magnitude of the market reaction to scheduled and unscheduled announcements. The findings also suggest analyst revisions are not responsible for the increase in delayed market reaction but just another way in which higher attention to certain announcements is revealed in the days that follow the release.
Despite the requisite of immediateness in the disclosure of relevant information, our findings suggest there is to some extent selective disclosure. Across hours of the day we find there is a higher propensity to release bad news after trading hours. This selective disclosure is encouraged by the fact that after trading hours, MSAs are associated with a lower magnitude of market reaction to non-periodic and multiple MSAs. There is, however, little impact of releasing MSAs after trading hours on the market reaction to periodic MSAs.
Finally, our results demonstrate that by requesting a trading halt in anticipation of MSAs, firms attract investor attention and partially offset the impact of the level of distraction produced by the volume of competing information. In the short term, the magnitude of the market reaction increases in response to post-halt MSAs. Additionally, the delayed market reaction differential is negative following MSAs released after a trading halt requested by the firm. Table 1  Sample and Descriptive Statistics   This table reports [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In Panel A, the abnormal number of trades is measured as the number of trades on day one divided by the average number of trades for the ten-day benchmark period. In Panel B abnormal number of trades is measured as the average number of trades for the ten-day post-announcement period divided by the average number of trades for the ten-day benchmark period. Difference between the top and the bottom quintiles are reported. ***, **, and * indicate difference in means (medians) are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Panel [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In Panel A, the abnormal trading volume is measured as the trading volume on day one divided by the average trading volume for the ten-day benchmark period. In Panel B abnormal trading volume is measured as the average trading volume for the ten-day post-announcement period divided by the average trading volume for the ten-day benchmark period. Difference between the top and the bottom quintiles are reported. ***, **, and * indicate difference in means (medians) are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Panel Size is the logarithm of market capitalization. Number of MSAs is the total number of MSAs released on the announcement day. Relative order uses the time stamp to determine the position of the MSAs relative to all the MSAs released on the announcement day. Good News is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the sign of the one-day return reaction is positive and 0 otherwise. Outside market hours is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the MSA is released either before or after hours and 0 otherwise. Friday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MSA is released on a Friday. Halt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm requested a trading halt in anticipation of the release of the MSA and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Size is the logarithm of market capitalization. Number of MSAs is the total number of MSAs released on the announcement day. Relative order uses the time stamp to determine the rank of the MSAs relative to all the MSAs released on the announcement day. Good News is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the sign of the one-day return reaction is positive and 0 otherwise. Outside market hours is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the MSA is released either before or after hours and 0 otherwise. Friday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MSA is released on a Friday. Halt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm requested a trading halt in anticipation of the release of the MSA and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The dependent variables are the delayed abnormal number of trades differential and the delayed abnormal share volume differential. The differential is calculated as the difference between the ten-day and one-day magnitude of the number of trades and share volume. Size is the logarithm of market capitalization. Number of MSAs is the total number of MSAs released on the announcement day. Relative order uses the time stamp to determine the rank of the MSAs relative to all the MSAs released on the announcement day. Good News is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the sign of the one-day return reaction is positive and 0 otherwise. Outside market hours is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the MSA is released either before or after hours and 0 otherwise. Friday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MSA is released on a Friday. Halt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm requested a trading halt in anticipation of the release of the MSA and 0 otherwise. Revision is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MSA is followed by an analyst recommendation revision.***, **, * denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Relative order uses the time stamp to determine the rank of the MSAs relative to all the MSAs released on the announcement day. Good News is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the sign of the one-day return reaction is positive and 0 otherwise. Outside market hours is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the MSA is released either before or after hours and 0 otherwise. Friday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MSA is released on a Friday. Halt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm requested a trading halt in anticipation of the release of the MSA and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the regression results examining the impact of sources of distraction on the short term magnitude of the market reaction to the after trading hours sample in the 24,519 MSAs that occurred during the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Size is the logarithm of market capitalization. Number of MSAs is the total number of MSAs released on the announcement day. Relative order uses the time stamp to determine the rank of the MSAs relative to all the MSAs released on the announcement day. Good News is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the sign of the one-day return reaction is positive and 0 otherwise. Outside market hours is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the MSA is released either before or after hours and 0 otherwise. Friday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MSA is released on a Friday. Halt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm requested a trading halt in anticipation of the release of the MSA and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
